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LIBERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA '
"They can go to the Constitutional Court a 100 times, but we are
not going to allow them to stop change"
President Nelson Mandela
The Star May 111999
4.11.1.2 The democratic movement must resist the liberal
concept of 'less government', which while being presented as a
philosophical approach towards the state in general is in fact
aimed specifically at the weakening of the democratic state. The
purpose of this offensive is precisely to deny the people the
possibility to use the collective strength and means concentrated
in the democratic state to bring about the transformation of
society"
from "The State and Social Transformation" ANC Discussion
Document The African Communist. First Quarter 1997
I. Introduction
The final report of the TRC elicited heated criticism from several quarters. Opposition
parties were outraged at its "ANC-bias", claimed it had "lost its way", had failed to
appreciate "different cultural attitudes" and was "a huge rhetoric exercise to reinforce a
lie".2 Mahmood Mandani, too, accused the TRC of establishing its "version of the truth
... through narrow lenses",3 although his criticism makes a different point.
Implicit in much of this criticism is the sentiment that the state has taken sides, and
thereby acted illegitimately. More generally, the policy of transformation is perceived as
itself unfair because of its programmes of racial preference. For some this concern about
the nature of the South African state is expressed via a conceptual distinction between
"liberation democracy" and "liberal democracy", with the former involving the
permanent capture of state power and resources in the name of the "people", and the
latter, neutrality, tolerance and pluralism.4
For Mandani, on the other hand, the way the TRC has framed its inquiries and
deliberations into "the truth" is to be criticised not for neglecting white perspectives but
for compromising too much with "the political compromise of 1994 and hence "the legal
fetishism of "Apartheid". 5 For the opposition parties, it is the intuition (more or less
articulated), that the state should remain neutral in relation to different ways of life and
individual preferences and aspirations, that fuels their objection. One of the aims of what
follows is to identify the conceptual structure of this intuition, the conceptual principles
of the political argument to which it belongs. Implicit in much of this criticism is, I
suggest, the (liberal) view that the state should eschew perfectionism and not seek to
promote any one understanding of the good at the expense of others. I thus a) identify the
specific conceptions of equality and freedom informing this perspective and b) discuss
their role in the debate over transformation.
1 also attempt to draw out and delineate the concepts and normative principles implicit in
the ANC's transformation project. Mamdani, for his part is, as we have seen, concerned
that the "experience of the most" has been "written out of history" 6 If he is right, the
ANC will have failed to live up to the very majoritarian and perfectionist principles upon
which, I shall suggest, its transformation project depends. And these principles, I also
argue, and those of a form of democracy whose interpretation of the values of freedom
and equality cannot be caught by any distinction as coarse as that between "liberal" and
"liberation democracy'.7
2. The liberal theory of equal liberty and the neutral state
This theory employs a conception of liberty that is individual, negative and pluralist
These characteristics all reflect a specific conception of the person viz. as a moral agent
able to form, revise and pursue individual conceptions of the good 8 Thus each individual
is to enjoy the fullest liberty to realise her aims and preferences compatible with an equal
liberty for others. All those conceptions of the good the pursuit of which does not infringe
upon the personal freedom of others to pursue their own conceptions of the good are thus
admissible under this principle of liberty. The principle of equal liberty provides the
requisite moral space for the pursuit of any members of this set of reasonable conceptions
of the good. Excluded are those conceptions of the good, the pursuit of which, if
allowed, results in a "net decrease in the number (of conceptions of good) eventually
practiced."'
Only this principle of liberty accords, it is argued, proper respect to individuals as moral
agents. Any violation of the autonomy of the individual, occurring, for example, as a
result of sacrificing the good of some to the greater good of others, is thus ruled out on
this principle. In order to accord equal respect to all persons, as persons, the principle of
the "separateness of persons" 10 must be respected. Not to do so involves denying to
some the status of autonomous moral agents. In the Kantian idiom, individuals must be
treated as ends in themselves, not as means for the attainment of the goals of others. In
this perspective there exists, then, a plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good and
individuals should enjoy the "maximum degree of non-interference (negative liberty)
compatible with the minimum demands of social life" " in order optimally to pursue their
conceptions of the good. The moral demands of living with others, of social life, are here
satisfied by apportioning equal degrees of sovereignty or discretionary freedom to
individuals so that each may "pursue his own good in his own way" (Mill). Society, on
this view, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not presuppose any
particular conception of the good, for any other arrangement would fail to respect them as
moral persons capable of autonomously choosing and practicing their own conceptions of
the good. Hence, for Dworkin, "the constitutive morality of liberalism consists of a
theory of equality which supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is possible,
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. l2
Were a determinate conception of the good to be promoted by the state the consequence
would be that individuals not sharing the conception in question would be coercively
interfered with '3 Their rights to negative liberty would be either diluted or altogether
alrrogated Equality, on this view of the person and society, consists, then, in a
distribution of negative liberty that is equal across individuals. Only those distributions
which do not abridge or abrogate anyone's negative liberty can thus satisfy the
requirements of equality.
The normative priority of the individual entails, too, that any adjustment to the schedule
of individual rights or to the scope of the questions to be decided by the individual rather
than by social-decision procedures must be consented to by those affected. Because they
hold such rights as individuals, individually, any decision to give up a portion of them to
the collectivity must be a unanimous decision. The practical obstacles to satisfying the
requirements of unanimity results very often in recourse to judicial review and
supertnajoritarian thresholds, measures designed to protect individual rights from
interference by the collectivity.
It is worth pointing out, though, that such devices (entrenched clauses, judicial review)
are not entailed by a liberalism of the sort under consideration. l4 What is required is that,
whether constrained by a formal constitution to do so or not, majorities do not in the
course of the democratic political process strive for any outcome incompatible with the
principle of the greatest equal liberty. Individual rights to negative liberty are not
themselves to be considered appropriate subjects for political deliberation and decision-
making. Irrespective of whether their derivation is from some "Archimidean point" " or
the hermeneutics of public life16 they provide the framework for the political process
itself and it is only by so respecting and protecting them that "the fact of pluralism"
can be maximally accommodated.
3. Liberal equality and transformation
For those who endorse (more or less implicitly) the above conceptions of freedom and
equality the transformation policy of the current government is quite plainly
unacceptable. From their point of view, its redistributive programmes and special
opportunities for the previously disadvantaged black citizens constitutes a flagrant
violation of the neutrality required from the state if individuals are to be respected as
moral persons. When offices, posts, capital and credit are not equally accessible to all,
the individuals discriminated against are prevented from realising their potential as
autonomous moral persons 1S It is just because "transformation is tougher than
transition"19 that many white citizens have decided to "fight back". 20 The transformation
project is perceived as straightforwardly inegalitarian and the call for a national
consensus as adding insult to the injury of affirmative action.3I
For others, the transformation project can be accomodated by a liberalism of the sort
sketched above, after some conceptual adjustments. Thus, once it is acknowledged (and
not all liberals are prepared to acknowledge this e.g. those who identify in "character" a
condition sufficient for escaping from any "poverty trap") that socio-economic conditions
can prevent individuals from being able effectively to exercise the rights to negative
liberty formally theirs, it becomes possible to justify redistribution and preferential
treatment ("reverse discrimination') on impeccably liberal grounds22 These are seen as
measures needed to rectify inequalities produced by the white minority regime. It is
possible to read some explanations of transformation in this way, e.g. when Mbeki
identifies as its goal the breaking of the connection between race and economic
inequality23 and refers to the need for "emergency measures" 24 in order to effect this
result. And it has been interpreted in this way by some white liberals too. 25 A
"difference-blind social space" K characterised by a "level playing field" and neutral state
is (still) considered the objective of such interventions. Whatever collective intervention
may exist it is always fulfilling a role defined for it by the equal individual liberty
principle i.e. the "normative priority of individual to community" 27 remains intact in
spite of the importance accorded collectively initiated measures of compensation
4. Transformation and the Politics of the Common Good
The objective of transformation, according to Mbeki, is the establishment of a society
characterised by "the equality of the national groups",28 by a proper "racial balance" or
representativity"29 throughout all its sectors, classes and status orders. This society is one
in which the importance of "affirming the national character . "30 (emphasis added) has
been recognised, i.e. the fact that South Africa comprises (sub-national") clusters of
individuals and that a determinate mode of co-existence of these is constitutive of an
ethically satisfactory social order.
Attaining this objective entails "transforming the entire fabric of social life in South
Africa" and requires, under current circumstances, the policies of preferential treatment
for black citizens referred to above. How, once this transformation is achieved, such a
mode of co-existence is to be maintained is not clear. What is clear, though, is that what
is envisioned here is the society as a whole, as a collective unit of agency, acting upon
itself to secure a certain outcome or structure for itself. 32 This, then, is a common good
requiring collective action. It is, moreover, a common good of a specific sort - the goal
held in common is not that of a society of autonomous liberal individuals each striving
for her own good within a framework of state neutrality, but rather that of a society in
which a specific conception of the good is pursued by the state itself, in which the society
seeks to achieve a certain "end-state" for itself through "collective instruments of
decision" (Taylor) and action. This collectivity just is, then, a "transindividual" entity,
one that exists to the precise extent that individuals decide and act together, and not
separately, as "individual choosers". Its members wish to be defined primarily as such,
i.e. as participants in a common undertaking "concerned about the shape of their
society/culture as a whole"33 (Taylor 1992 "Atomism": 47). When society is thus
understood, i.e. as a collective entity in the above sense, it can then rightfully determine
the distribution of collectively and individually held rights.M
The project of transformation cannot, then, be accommodated under the principles of a
liberalism of equal individual rights which is loath to acknowledge the claims of
collective identities and which only allows for collective intervention vis-a-vis the above
rights when this is necessary in order to realise them. This is not the case with respect to
the project of transformation because it is quite clearly grounded in a judgement about the
nature of the good life, viz. it requires a social context in which white citizens have been
displaced from hegemony not only in the political sphere (narrowly defined) but
throughout society. The transformation policy of the ANC has, then, to be understood as
itself an effort to realise a specific conception of the good, rather than as an attempt to
equalise the conditions under which individuals and communities pursue their own
conceptions of the good. This policy cannot, thus, be equated with the attempt to
actualise de facto what would otherwise remain merely formal individual rights. It
cannot be understood in the terms of any such "dialectic of de jure and de facto equality"
(Habermas) because its aim is not merely to level the relations among anonymous
citizens
This, then, is just the sort of good whose pursuit is not acceptable within a liberal
perspective because it does not accept the ultimate normative priority of the individual
over the collective. On the contrary, here it is up to the collective to decide on what the
proper pattern of individual interaction is to be - rather than this being simply allowed to
crystallise out of unconstrained individual undertakings. This could at best only quite
accidentally produce the requisite distribution of national group identities and would not,
in any case, satisfy the desire for collective control that marks the project of
transformation.
The objective of transformation is not to establish a "difference-blind" society because
"racial representivity" would not then be a consideration of any importance. Just what is
meant by "equality", "balance" and "representativity" is left open - does it mean
"reflecting national demographics" (and if so how exactly) or do other considerations
come into play when "balance" is determined? Be this as it may, what is clear is that
racial identity will continue under such conditions to be of importance in determining the
distribution of individuals across positions, posts and offices. This does not mean that
any one national or racial group will receive systematic preference over another and
inequality of this sort is not integral to the project. It does, however, mean that an
individual will be debarred from entry into a particular position if her admission would
upset of the structure of "equality among all our national groups". Thus "difference-
blind" criteria of admission operate only within the limits of "representativity" and some
individuals will find their life plans frustrated by the application of the criterion of
"representativity".
Those who are excluded, then, by this project, are all those who do not identify with the
principle of collective self-regulation as described above; those who, in other words, do
not identify their good with the good of the nation so understood. This is not restricted to
individuals of any specific racial identity but includes all those who identify with a
society in which an individual's freedom to practice her conception of the good is held to
be of paramount importance and in which, as a consequence, only those conceptions of
the good the pursuit of which does not infringe on the freedom of other individuals are
permissible. If all these are excluded by the pursuit of such a common good so, too,
however, does a society of liberal individuals involve the exclusion of all those for whom
the good life and a certain national configuration cannot be separated. It should not be
thought that the contrast drawn here denies that "liberal individuals" are at all concerned
with the overall shape of their society. They might be. But their support for collective
decision-making and for collection action is intended by them to establish conditions
propitious for the maximisation of individual (negative) freedom, not for its restriction by
the collective to which they belong.
5. Democracy and Liberalism in the Project of Transformation
How can this official promotion of a conception of the good life be defended? It is not
enough to claim that because its supporters are so numerous in South Africa - the
majority - it is ipso facto just. This would be to beg the very issue at question here viz
whether the collective should have the meta-right to decide on the distribution of rights
between itself and individuals i.e. whether the collective has the right to interfere with the
realisation of individual conceptions of the good and life-plans. On the other hand, it
needs immediately to be added that the presumption against the collective holding this
right would appear no less question-begging. For the majority, pursuing this common
good is as much an expression of identity and preference as is the pursuit of individual
goods. It may well require the abridgement of certain individual rights as positions will
not be equally open to all individuals (as "individuals") under conditions where
"representativity" is considered crucial and from a liberal point of view this is considered
oppressive, not of any particular racial group perhaps, but of liberal culture itself. But to
repress the majority preference in the name of individual rights seems no more reasonable
than not to. What freedom, equality and pluralism require is by no means self-evident in
the case of this contention for no neutral metric would seem to be available to adjudicate
it. We are dealing here with two qualitatively different (and incommensurable)
conceptions of freedom and the good.35 One prioritises individual freedom and the equal
distribution of such freedom. The other collective self-determination and equality of
influence over collective decisions which , under conditions of division, amounts to
according to the majority the right to represent the collective itself. 36 Equality, here,
consists in equal weight being attributed to individual inputs to collective decisions and is
not violated if the preferences of some turn out eventually not to be satisfied.
So, rather than attempting to adjudicate this contention it would seem more fruitful to
explore the grounds which might be invoked in defense of the legitimacy of the project of
transformation as well as those respects in which it can be seen as itself respecting the
principles of liberalism. This not in an effort to downplay the undeniable tension that
exists between this project and the prioritisation of individual freedom in the standard
liberal model. The state in South Africa today officially promotes a specific conception
of the good life for South Africans at the expense of other such conceptions. And this
policy rests on a conception of the "true" nature of South African society i.e. that the
"truth" of South African society is that it does not merely comprise individuals but rather
("sub") national clusters of individuals and that membership of these clusters is a
significant part of a citizen's identity.
Doesn't this promotion of such a "state-truth" render the regime not only fundamentally
illiberal but also "democratic" only in the totalitarian sense (of e.g. the erstwhile
"peoples' democracies")? Another way of approaching this might be via a consideration
of the "national consensus" around the project of transformation. What sort of
"consensus" is this? What are its implications for dissidents and does it extinguish
political pluralism?
What is perhaps most interesting about the project of transformation is just the way in
which it is articulated with principles deriving from the liberal tradition. In the first place
it is not clear that this project involves the abridgment of any fundamental individual
rights. There is no reason to expect the practice of transformation, nor the realization of
its goal of "equality between the national groups" to be incompatible with the protection
of fundamental rights and freedoms. 37 Thus the (individual) freedoms of thought,
expression, association and political participation, for example, are not touched. 38 And
whether these are given a primarily liberal or democratic gloss - i.e. whether they are
construed as vehicles for individual self-fulfillment or (participation in) collective
deliberation and self-determination - seems less important, in the present context, than
the fact of their constitutional entrenchments. To be sure, the freedoms of some are
abridged in order to promote the good as conceived by others, but this is done in a
constitutional framework that preserves the fundamental rights of all, both qua
sovereign individuals and as members of the collective.
The ANC, according to Mbeki, is committed to the principle of pluralism and the rights
and freedoms indissociable from it.39 The "rules of the game" of multi-party democracy
are, then, not the "rules of the game" of transformation as understood by the ANC - it is
itself subject to the anonymous rules governing the democratic contestation of and access
to power. 40 It would like as many citizens as possible to identify with its interpretation
of equality and the constitution, but there is no reason to believe that it does - or will -
consider such identification a condition of participation in the democratic process itself.41
The national consensus would not, then, seem to involve any closure in excess of that
always required to maintain the conditions of democratic political contestation. It is
properly seen as an interpellation, a call rallying citizens to the project of transformation
and not as itself setting the limits of legitimate political discourse and practice. It is, then,
compatible with political pluralism and keeping "open" the "place of power" (Lefort).
Although the project of transformation involves the pursuit of a common good and the
use of state power to realise it, it no more seeks to deny moral personality, equality or
freedom than does the liberal project. Transformation does, however, rest on a different
understanding of these values. Thus it depends e.g. on a specific conception of equality
which differs from that embodied in the principle of equal individual liberty. Equality in
collective decisions under conditions of division entails the primacy of the will of the
majority over that of minorities whereas any such arbitration by number is irrelevant to
the principle of equal individual liberty. On this latter, individuals are equal to the extent
they equally enjoy such liberty and not to the extent they enjoy equality of influence vis-
a-vis collective decisions. It is upon this last conception of equality that the project of
transformation draws to legitimate itself. Does this mean that it boils down to a mere
"counting of noses"? Without fully engaging the question of the conditions of just
collective decision-making, or that of the extent to which these are satisfied in South
Africa, what can nevertheless be said is that the democratic identification of the popular
will requires the satisfaction of the conditions of proper public deliberation and
argumentation42 (as well as counting) and that these are obviously only imperfectly
realised in South Africa today.43
Those attached to a liberalism in denial of "national difference" may find the form of
majoritarianism discussed above incommodious, but it is no less democratic for that
reason. They are obliged to conform to legislation but are free to contest it - they are not
subject to any forced "ethical integration" (Habermas). As far as the TRC is concerned,
the relevant question has to do with whether or not in considering its "truth" - i.e. its
understanding of the history and nature of South African society - as setting the
parameters for the commission's reflections and decisions, the ANC has overstepped the
mark of legitimate partiality? In addressing this question it must not be overlooked that
the state in question is, in some important respects, democratic and perfectionist rather
than liberal and neutral. And, the new national identity incorporated in this
understanding of the "truth" of South African society is not, it is worth repeating, some
sort of "higher third" (Schmitt) able to blend old antagonistic identities into a new
synthesis without loss. It would be wrong, however, on the analysis offered here, to run
this sort of democratic hegemony together with hegemony tout court.
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43. Of course, if on the other hand, one remains convinced that the ANC believes it
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